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Wyman v. James: The Epitome Of A Judicial "Red Herring"
INTRODUCTION

"Law is a matter of rights and duties and not simply the discretion of
officials."*
The American legal system faces a great task today while its body of
administrative law undergoes a fundamental transformation. This
transformation can be seen through the bifurcated application of administrative discretion. The transformation, from its inception, is largely
due to the "handiwork of federal judges".'

It is this dual approach upon which this note will focus.

Utilizing

Wyman v. James2 as a touchstone; emphasis will be given to the possible

remedies-both judicial and administrative-that are available to ameliorate the effects of this approach and thereby avoiding future decisions
like Wyman. 3

Wyman was decided on an anomalous visitation/search distinction,
and seemingly predicated on administrative convenience coupled with a
species of the eroded right-privilege concept.4 I propose to illustrate
that the decision in Wyman is counter-productive given the pattern it
(the courts) previously set and that there are other viable alternatives
that do not abridge fundamental liberties.
BACKGROUND

Administrative law seeks to reconcile the fundamental proposition of
the liberal state that only intrusions in compliance with the legislative
process are allowed to interlope upon private liberty and property

interests. 5 This is the approach of the "traditional model" of adminis* Ronald M. Dworkin, Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
1. Stewart, Reformation'6l American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667
(1975).
-.- 2. See 400 U.S. 309. Wyman was a section 1983 Civil Rights action by a recipient
of state aid to families with dependent children for declaratory and injunctive relief.
It was alleged that no consent was given and the state did not procure a warrant for
official entry into recipients home. The State of New York-appealed the district court's
judgment and decree holding invalid and unconstitutional as applied Section 134 of the
New York Social Services Law, McKinney's Consolidated Laws, ch. 5 Section 175 of
the New York Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance, and Sections
351.10 and 351.21 of Title 18 of New York Code of Rules and Regulations. The
Supreme Court held that the home visitation was a reasonable administrative tool and
does not violate the fourth or fourteenth amendments.
3. Id.
4. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARe. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
5. Stewart, supra, 1669-76.
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trative law. 6 The regulation of private businesses in the latter part of
the nineteenth century became so vast that a set of principles were
needed to harmonize private interests with the ever increasing governmental power. This doctrine has been termed the "traditional model". 7
The doctrine is widely criticized for its limitations on protections to
newly recognized property and liberty interests. Critics state that such
interests are at least, if not more, entitled to protections from underserving infringements as traditionally recognized interests.'
Historically, the only interests that received constitutional protections,
in response to governmental interference, were those protected during
the early common law era.9 The interest in the eligibility for a gift, or
the opportunity to work for a given employer ° did not receive the same
constitutional safeguards." These unguarded interests were considered
"privileges" or "gratuities" and therefore not rights protected by legal
sanction.' 2 The right-privilege distinction, drawn in the early law, was
based on the contractarian view of the state as espoused by Rousseau
and Locke." The government analogized itself with a private philanthropist.' 4 The rationale, was that an intrusion by a private party would
be judicially determined by the existence or non-existence of a contract
giving consent. In the area of administrative law, one duly elects
government officials who decide on the acceptable procedures for administrative action-consent was therefore implied.
INCONSISTENT PATTERNS:

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The use of arbitrary governmental power conferred by this contractarian view became "less and less tolerable" as the role of government
expanded and dependence in the social sphere mushroomed. This intolerable situation gave rise to decisions prohibiting the termination of
statutory entitlements such as welfare payments, without a prior adjudicatory hearing before the agency.' 5 In Escalera v. N.Y Housing Au6. Id. 1671-74, for a list of the four elements in the "traditional" model; and to
secure a broader understanding of the underlying theory.
7. Id.
8. Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, 4 (1969).
9. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290
U.S. 190 (1933).
10. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.R. 517 (1892).
11. Compare, cases cited in note 9 supra, with Fleming v. Nestor.
12. Reich, New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
13. See The Meaning of the "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CALiF. L. REv. 590 (1930). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386 (1778).
14. See Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also Lynch
v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571 (1934). Accord n.2 supra at 319.
15. See, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 234 (1970).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss2/13

2

Myers: Wyman v. James: The Epitome of a Judicial Red Herring

406

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

thority'" the court found tenancy in low-income housing worthy of
constitutional protection. In Graham v. Richardson 7 where the equal
protection clause was asserted to rectify the discriminatory allotment of
welfare funds to three female aliens, the Court said the statutes of
Arizona and Pennsylvania created classifications based on alienage and
were therefore unconstitutional. Moreover, Justice Blackmun paradoxically" s states that characterization of governmental benefits as a
"right" or "privilege" is not determinative of constitutional rights. 9 This
pattern of decisions before and after Wyman illustrates how the Court's
protective arm shields individuals from abusive governmental power in
these areas of "new property". °
The inconsistency of Wyman can also be shown in the area of
searches and seizures, where Wyman is considered to be a visit and not a
search because of its benevolent rather than investigative character. This
distinction is questionable at best.
In 1959 the Court decided its first case, Frank v. Maryland,2' involving a warrantless administrative search, where no violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights were found. The Court said that the
warrantless health inspection was based on probable cause. The defendant was fined twenty dollars after being convicted of violating the
Baltimore City Code by not allowing the Health Commissioner into his
home without a warrant. The Court ruled that in light of the continuous pattern (emphasis added) of health inspections without a warrant
and in view of the modern health needs, the warrantless inspection,
based on probable cause, was not violative of the fourth amendment.2 2
It was only eight years later that the Court overruled the Frank decision. 23 The new ruling stated that administrative searches without a
warrant by municipal health and safety inspectors constitute an intolerable encroachment upon the right to privacy. The Court decided this
issue through companion cases.2 4 The Wyman decision thereby
16. 425 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).

17. 403 U.S. 344 (1971).
18. Justice Blackmun, five months earlier, delivered the opinion in Wyman.
19. See n.17 supra at 374.

20. See generally n. 12 supra. Reich, defines "new property" as all forms of government largesse: defense contracts, welfare subsidies, governmental payrolls, etc. Although the cases mentioned in nn.15-17 are distinguishable on the facts, they all
include the protection of the lowly indigent when his constitutional gaurantees are at

stake. The interests in Wyman should therefore not receive any less protection than in
Graham, Goldberg or Escalera.

21. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
22. Id.

23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
24. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), was decided during the same term

of Court as Camara. Accord, Terry v. Ohio where Justice Harlan said the fourth amend-
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plugged the expansion of welfare rights and signified a retreat from
traditional fourth amendment standards. The decision exhumes the
19th century's ghostly right-privilege2" status distinction, that informed
society on the advantages of a legal background versus that of a pool
hall.2

6

INCONSISTENT PATTERNS:

ADMINISTRATIVE

The incongruence of Wyman is not solely limited to judicial decisions.
A cursory view of the political and administrative history reveals a
smattering of its "red herring" traits also. The full impact of welfare
administration in particular, and social legislation in general, cannot be
fully appreciated unless there is some understanding of its history.
The "traditional model" was actually designed to curb agency power.
The fact that an agency fails to fulfill a legislative directive or preserve
the collective interests 27 that administrative regimes are formed to
serve-is not the concern of the "traditional model.1 28 We find the
roots of our problem growing out of too much discretion within the
administrative agencies. While the administrative powers were kept
within workable parameters29 the problem of discretion could be curtailed. It was the New Deal Era that swept in this administrative breath
of strength. This seemingly uncontrolled discretion was the catalyst for
ment applies to all intrusions by the government where the sanctity of a man's home
is concerned. The decision of Camara and See exemplifies the posture that the courts
have taken concerning administrative intrusions on the liberfies of business interests. Mr.
Justice Douglas, (dissenting) in Wyman categorically states that the fourth amendment's proscriptions should be 'applied to the sociolistic state that we are approaching
and should not be considered exclusive to capitalism; supra n.2 at 334.
25. Notwithstanding the visitation search distinction noted by the Court, the essential difference between Camara, See and Wyman is the economic-social interest. The
receipt of largesse in Wyman was being conditioned upon the assertion or non-assertion
of Mrs. James' fourth amendment rights.
26. Compare Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882) ("keeping a pool
table for hire" considered a privilege) with Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873),
where an attorney's means of a livelihood were considered more respectable and therefore not a right. An interesting comparison of judicial logic.
27. The overall goal should be the protection of private rights without the intrusion
of unauthorized government conduct.
28. See n.1 supra at 683. Professor Stewart comments on some agencies that
employ the "devil theory". He also remarks on the partiality of agencies to regulated
and client firms. See also, Jaffe, Two Days to Save the World, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 17
(1971).
29. "[Workable parameters" refers to the economic forum for which the "traditional model" was conceived. The New Deal Congresses, in introducing their social
agencies, demanded a broad range of discretion, asserting that this "free hand" would
enable the agencies to restore health to the economy. There is talk in the literature that
"broad discretion" can be substituted for "expertise". The New Deal defenders used this
concept of public administration to emphasize their position. The position that these
agencies were advocating needed this breadth of discretion. Since they were not professionals, there would be a certain trial and error process. Stewart, supra n.1 at 167681.
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the economic-social split in administrative policy. The defenders of
these New Deal agencies thought it unwise to follow rigid procedures.8 0
The courts, however, were of a different school of thought and turned
to the Administrative Procedure Act's history and instituted a method
of controlling the exercise of this discretion. They established a trilogy
of requirements:"' more substantiality of the evidence supporting the
agencies factfinding, with more procedural safeguards; 2 that choices
made be reasonably consistent and persuasively justified, especially
where one's expectation interests were involved; 3 and a plain showing
of a legislative purpose as a means of restraining agency discretion
when civil liberties were at stake.8 4
These judicial safeguards were considered by many administrators to
be an abundance of caution. Nevertheless, they did serve to temporarily
trim agency discretion and protect the interests of the regulated with
same hand. Through the skillful use of this "caution" emerged an
amicable relationship between the administrators and the judges.
Why then are the states presently able to enter a welfare recipients
home without a warrant? Why does the judicial system's hierarchy
sanction such a disrespectful and whimsical act? Why haven't the courts
instituted their "caution" in this sphere as it has in others? Many
scholars maintain that the once amicable relationship has vanished and
that these agencies have realized a new emergence of strength that the
The
judiciary-through the conventional means--cannot restrain."
judiciary, now on the defensive, speaks of "balancing the various factors"
that effect not only the interest groups, but the public's interest as well. 36
Professors Reich and Stewart maintain that this abusive use of discretion affects the area of social welfare more than others. 37 Their position
is buttressed by the well settled opinion that agencies, in implementing
30. Id. see generally, Landis, THE ADMINIs'TrvE PROCESS (1938).
3 1. See n.1 supra.
32. Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
33. Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Zoning Commission, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
34. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1959) and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959).
Although they concerned issues of national security, the fundamental rights
that were being asserted are sufficiently analogous to Wyman.
35. See generally, n.31 supra.
36. See n.29 supra. See also, Reich, Law of a Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227,
where he labels this "public interest" jargon a myth used to camouflage the mode of
dispensing benefits. It has also been termed an "admission of legislative inability to
resolve hard questions of choice." The doctrine of separation of powers is the real
obstacle that prevents the judiciary from being too harsh on the agencies; especially
where they are within a "liberal" interpretation of their legislative directives.
37. Reich supra, n.12. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues. 74 YALE L.J. 245 (1965). Compare, New York's laws with HEW Handbook; see n.2 supra and n.62 infra.
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legislative directives, are unduly favorable to organized interests.38 If
this position has any significant degree of merit, the regulated businesses
and other organized groups are no match for the scattered interests of
the poor.
OTHER JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES

The central issue that is raised in situations such as Wyman, is
whether the state may condition an individual's receipt of government
largesse on the waiver of a constitutional right. The intimidating
structure of the welfare system will probably hinder any organized type
of resistance. The very foundation of individuality is the power to
control a portion of one's prosperity and welfare. In a society that
honors material "well-being," the importance of this power is beyond
question. 9 The dependence, and the ever lurking threat of denial,
revocation, or suspension, forces the recipients into uncertain positions.
The welfare mother who must be embarrassed by unreasonable intrusions into her home is only one example of this pendulum of uncertainty
that hangs on reliance.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Wyman, impliedly
acknowledges that Mrs. James is receiving a "privilege" from the government.4 0 Albeit, the judiciary still possesses a few effective ways of
clipping agency discretion and also
avoiding the "harsh consequences of
41
the right-privilege distinction."
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS VERSUS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. '42 The erosion of rightprivilege gave rise to conditioning the privilege upon the waiving of one's
constitutional rights. In Barsky v. Board of Regents, 48 for example,
a physicians license was suspended because he had invoked the fifth
amendment privilege before, an investigating body. The Court in
Barsky stated:
The practice of medicine in New York is lawfully prohibited by the
State except upon conditions it imposes. Such practice is a privilege
38. Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participationin the
Administrative Process, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 525 (1972).
39. See generally Reich, supra n.12.
40. See n.2 supra.
41. See n.4 supra at 1445.
42. Justice Holmes' famous epigram from McAuliffe supra, n.10. The quote, in
essence, means no one has a constitutional right to government largesse.
43. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
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granted by -the State44under its substantially plenary power to fix the
terms of admissions.
Do recipients of largesse have any rights? The Barsky decision
would lead one to believe that there are rights protected by the Constitution, but they are not exercised at the citizen's discretion. The idea of
unconstitutional conditions is centered on the position that state and
federal legislatures can control private conduct by conditioning the
extension of benefits upon the surrender of some constitutional right.
The position has been stated.in syllogistic terms: "if the legislature may
withhold a particular benefit it may grant it in a limited form since the
greater power of withholding absolutely must necessarily include the
lesser power of granting with restrictions." 5
Hence, there is no deprivation of a right, since the recipient may
retain the right by not accepting the benefit.4 6 The overwhelming
number of government regulatory agencies and welfare programs, coupled with the rapid expansion of government contracts, increase the
"potential erosion" of fundamental liberties by use of these unconstitutional conditions.4 7
In essence, the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine prohibits the
government from doing indirectly what an express constitutional provision forbids it doing outright. 4 In Sherbert v. Verner,49 the Doctrine
was invoked to prevent South Carolina from discontinuing unemployment benefits because the recipient refused Saturday employment for
religious reasons. It has been applied in balancing the privilege of
school attendance with the acceptance of summary dismissals. 50
The Doctrine is a packaged remedy in the manner which it sustains
judicial objectivity.5 1 The Court can avoid the appearance of acting as a
"super-legislature" because the test is simply whether or not the government is conditioning its largesse on the waiver of some constitutional
right. The Doctrine also rescues the judiciary from those very close
cases where the evidence is scant and agency discretion appears to have
been the only guideline. The protection .afforded by this Doctrine seems
44. Id. 451.
45. Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARVAD L.REv. 1595 (1960).
46. See generally n.2 supra.

47. See generally nn.4 and 46 supra.
48. See, Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v.RR. Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1948).
Accord, Van Alstyne supra n.4.
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150, (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930

(1961).
51. See generally, n.38 supra. The doctrine of separation of powers prevents the
judiciary from forcefully using any other means except constitutional safeguards (i.e.
the triology of requirements intheory are almost useless when the separation of powers
doctrine isconsidered).
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to be the strongest shield recipients of largesse have. A petitioner need
only show that the condition complained of is unreasonable because it
abridges the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution.5 2
CHILLING EFFECTS

Perhaps a literal application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine begs the question. The concept of "indirect effects," however, has
been mentioned by one legal scholar as another effective means of
protecting an individual's fundamental liberties.5" A court, in deciding
that a particular regulation or prevalent administrative practice "chills"
a constitutional right,54 can simply invalidate it. The test is whether
these rights of the affected class outweigh the. involvement of the regulation and significant state interests.55
Shelton v. Tucker5" provides a classic illustration of how these "indirect effects" on constitutional rights can be invalidated. In Shelton, a
state statute required an annual affidavit from every teacher listing each
organization of which he was a member or contributed to for the past
five years. The Court ruled that such a statute had a "chilling" effect
on the freedoms of association and speech which are protected by the
first amendment.5 7 An absolute right of non-disclosure was not found. 58
Instead, it projected the probable effect such a statute would have on
discouraging the exercise of the absolute right of association and concluded that the state could find another alternative to protecting its interests. The setting of Wyman v. James can also have a "chilling" effect
if the recipient's consent is due to the probable suspension of the aid.
Moreover, in the welfare area, the congressional directives provide other viable alternatives for acquiring the needed information. 9
52. See, n.4 supra at 1448, where Van Alstyne criticizes the doctrine based on
Holmes' opinion in McAuliffe.
53. See n.4 supra.

54. See generally n.25 supra at 109.

An action under the Civil Rights Act, section

1983, is a means of relief for deprivations not only of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, but also of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the . . .laws

of the United States."

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

The Social Security Act does

not confer a "right" per se, because no state is obligated to participate or provide state
aid of any kind. Section 1983 does, however, create the right, in any state which has

elected to benefit from the program, for individuals to be treated in compliance with the
Act. See n.27 supra at 85-110.
55. See n.4 supra.
56. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
57. See n.4 supra.

58. See generally n.59 supra.
59. See n.2 supra at 342, 343, 347. See also the H.E.W. Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, part IV section 2200(e)(1). Accord, Dershowitz and Ely, note
68 infra at 1206 n.40.
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ABSTENTION UNDER SECTION

1983

ACTIONS

When a case represents a question of state law and the possibility of
the federal courts deciding a constitutional issue unnecessarily, the
doctrine of abstention has been invoked. 6° Essentially, the doctrine
provides for the federal court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when: the
state law is unclear on an issue and it seems proper for a state court to
decide the issue, thereby avoiding a constitutional decision; state public
policy is concerned-the state should then handle the matter to avoid
friction with the federal judiciary; the state court can issue a remedy that
protects the plaintiff from irreparable injury and safeguards his constitutional claim.6 1
The decision in Harrison v. NAACP 62 epitomizes the conflict with
abstention in section 1983 actions. The Supreme Court decided that
the district court should have abstained in this action, which questioned
the constitutionality of several Virginia statutes prohibiting solicitation
of litigation concerning racial integration. The three dissenting justices
argued that section 1983 actions are never apposite for abstention. The
Court has not required abstention in section 1983 actions since Harrison
was rendered."
The practical effects of abstaining in section 1983 actions presents a
persuasive argument for deciding the issue on the merits. Even though
the welfare plaintiff would suffer immediate financial injury while the
issue was being decided, the most persuasive position seems to be the
"chilling" effect the threat to the fundamental right would have during
the interim period. 64
Some legal scholars have suggested that somehow the Court should
have abstained or declined jurisdiction in Wyman. 65 However, the
practical effects welfare recipients would suffer outweigh all arguments
in favor of abstention.
CONCLUSION

Wyman v. James is a very good example of the gap between law-intheory and law-in-action. Using Professors Reich and Stewart's opin60. See, R.R. Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co,
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
61. See n.27 supra.
62. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).

63. See n.27 supra, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, for an excellent discussion on abstention
in section 1983 actions.
64. Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-490 (1965).
65. For an excellent discussion on the soundness of the Wyman decision see,
Dershowitz and Ely, Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Wyman is
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1204-1206, and 1224-1226 (1971).
most appropriately termed "a textbook example of reaching out prematurely to decide a
broad and novel issue of constitutional law".
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ion 66 as a postulate, one can readily conclude that the traditional model
of administrative law is in dire need of reformation and/or expansion.
The ability of the traditional model to control governmental power has
been seriously undermined by the present use of broad agency
authority as shown by Wyman. Admittedly, to reach the effective
equitable representation of the collective choice, seems beyond our
practical grasp. However, this new type of interest representation may
generate a new unified desire to avoid the abusive practices of the
present.67 But, if steps are not taken to curb this discretion, agency
solicitude with regard to regulated or private firms will probably continue. 6" Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society 9 suggests that full realization of interests representation is not in the near
future.
What then is the remedy? The judiciary must be the source
70
once again. After all, it was the "handiwork of federal judges"
that checked the initial agency actions. However, the attempt by
the judiciary must have more force and effect than the original
trilogy of requirements. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and "chilling" effects surely provide a beginning. Conceivably,
their actions, to be effective, must encompass a degree of "discretionary control over social and economic decisions". 71 Whatever judicial
means are finally employed to subdue agency discretion and to protect
the interests of the "lowly poor"7 2 surely must not follow the inconsistent posture of Wyman v. James.
The Court, referring to the benevolent purpose of inspection visits,
relied very strongly on the exercise of administrative discretion. This
partiality toward the state administrative agency denied Mrs. James the
protection of a fundamental liberty. The minor premise of the social
compact in American government ". . . was created to secure to the individuals the enjoyment of life, liberty and property. ' 73 If the idea of
liberty in the constitutional sense has any remaining meaning, it must
cover "personal and family affairs".7 4
JOSEPH KIRK MYERS
66. See nn.38-40 supra.
67. See n.24 supra.
68. Stewart supra n.1, 1789.
69. 43 U.S.L.W. 4561 (1976).
70. Stewart, supra n.1.
71. Id. at 1789-1790. "...
decisions that [are] greater than our traditions would
readily countenance".
72. Supra, n.2, Justice Marshall's dissent.

73. See, 18 CALIF. L.Rv.p. 583.
74. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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